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DWORKIN, HART, AND THE
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

PROBLEM

OF

MICHAEL MANDEL*

The following article analyzes the dispute between legal philosophers Ronald Dworkin and
H.L.A Hart over the nature of legal rights. The author argues that central to this dispute is a
pervasive methodological problem of social theory, the ''problem of theoretical perspective."
He makes use of a distinction between "internal" and "external" perspectives to defend what
he conceives to be Hart's more fully social approach to the conceptualization of legal rights.

I. INTRODUCTION

Since its publication in England in 1961, H.L.A. Hart's The
Concept of Law has aroused the antagonism of America's leading
legal

philosophers.

Undoubtedly

the

most

persistent

of the

antagonists has been Ronald Dworkin, Hart's successor to the Chair
of Jurisprudence at Oxford University and a legal philosopher with
an exceptionally high "recognition factor" on both sides of the
Atlantic. Dworkin's interest in the central theses of The Concept of
Law has lasted for over fifteen years, and his repeated attempts to
define and def end his disagreements with them constitute the core of
his contribution to legal philosophy.
In philosophical terms, the controversy is a "conceptual" one, about
the "nature" of legal rights. Such disputes are sometimes dismissed as
mere "terminological debates," quibbles about the proper use of
words, something the more practical-minded solve by stipulation so
• I am grateful to Harry Glasbeek, Reuben Hasson, Allan Hutchinson and the
editors of the Law and Society Review for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of
this paper.

they can get on with the real business of research and evaluation.
(Criminologists will recall the debates about the "meaning" of "crime,"
that is whether it includes all "deviance" or just "illegal" deviance.) Of
course, the problem with characterizing conceptual disputes in this way
is that it fails to account for their intensity and the intellectual rigor
with which they are often carried on, unless recourse is had to often
fantastic and

ultimately

unsatisfying theories

about the supposed

pathological motives of the disputants.1
In fact, conceptual debates have a deeper level of significance of
which the terminological question is only the surface. The one between
Dworkin and Hart, as I hope to demonstrate, is actually about nothing
less than what is important in the study of law as a branch of social
theory. To ask the nature of legal rights in this context is in fact to
ask what about legal rights matters-what is worthy of attention and
inquiry, whether empirical, moral, political, or historical. It is even to
ask who counts out of all the possible social actors and to whose
concerns attention should be given in the understanding of legal rights.
It has recently become easier to appreciate and, I believe, to

resolve the Dworkin/Hart controversy at this level because, in a flurry of
recent writings, Dworkin (1977a: 58-84; 1977b; 1977c; 1977d: 279-290,
appendix to paperback ed., 291-368) has directed his

mind

to

methodological questions and has finally hit upon what I conceive to
be the central issue between Hart and himself. This is what I shall
call

"the

problem

of

theoretical

perspective,"

a

pervasive

methodological problem of social theory fundamental to the philosophy
of law. It can be brought out in the following way.
It is a familiar feature of human, not merely academic, experience
that people disagree. They disagree not only over questions of
morality (for example, should the police be allowed to break the law
for reasons of "national security"?) and questions

of fact (for

example, did the police break the law?), but also over the proper
characterization of events, enterprises, and institutions (for example,
when the police break the law in order to disrupt radical political
groups, can they be said to be breaking the law for reasons of
"national security"?). Often this latter sort of disagreement seems to
depend not on some error on the part of one of the disputants, but
rather on their different perspectives (for example, the police ''view"
of "national security" vs. the radical view). Both sides seem right,
though only partially right and, therefore, partially wrong. It depends
on the way you look at it, we might want to say.
But what should the approach of the social theorist be to the
object of this sort of dispute (assuming it is worth theorizing about
in the first place)? From whose perspective is it to be represented? Is
one superior to all others? How is this to be decided? Or should
everybody's perspective be included? How can this be done? Do the
perspectives of the disputants, or indeed any of the participants,
exhaust the perspectives available to the theorist, or can there be a
distinct "theoretical" perspective?

This, then, is the problem of theoretical perspective. It arises as
an issue between Dworkin and Hart in the context of "hard" or
"controversial" legal cases. Dworkin points out that lawyers often
argue and judges often reason as if there were a single right answer
to a question of law, even when there is no statute or binding
decision which clearly governs the case at hand and even when there
is a deep division in the legal community as to what the answer is.
They may disagree over the answer, but they seem to agree (at
least if one restricts reference to official statements in briefs, oral
argument, and reasons for judgment) that there is an answer. They
assume, in other words, that there can be and are legal rights and
duties in controversial cases. More or less because of this, Dworkin
takes the same position. On the other hand, Hart argues in The
Concept of Law that legal rights and duties exist only when they
are manifestly accepted by the bulk of the relevant community, in the
sense that they flow either from rules which are themselves accepted
or from rules which are valid according to other, accepted rules (see
Hart,

1961: Ch. IV-VI). This

seems

to

exclude

them

from

controversial cases for the very reason that there is a controversy.
This will be so even though there may be agreement in the
community on the question of whether there is a right answer, as long
as there is disagreement about what the answer actually is. Thus,
Dworkin seems to adopt a view that is consistent and Hart a view
that is inconsistent with that of the participants. Of course, Dworkin

will disagree with some, perhaps all, of them over what the answer is,
but Hart seems to disagree with all of them over whether there is an
answer at all. To complicate matters further, each of these positions
comes to us as an analysis of the concepts of law, legal right, legal
duty, etc.
The most direct way out of this entanglement, it seems to me,
would be to say that Dworkin is concerned with the concepts of legal
right and legal duty as questions of law, viewed internally, from
within a given legal system, and that Hart is concerned with them
as questions about law, viewed externally , from outside any given
legal system. This dichotomy of perspective between "internal" and
"external" would be similar, but not identical, to the familiar
dichotomies of theory/practice and official/unofficial.2 The difference
would be that while Dworkin's concerns correspond to official theory,
Hart's include both official theory and unofficial practice. A spatial
metaphor seems appropriate to distinguish between the worlds of the
"insiders" (the legal profession, lawyers, and judges using their
special techniques of argumentation and justification) who make up
Dworkin's reference group and the "outsiders" (everyone else) who
also figure in Hart's system. We might further mark the distinction
by calling Dworkin's concerns the "lawyer's" concerns or the
concerns of legal ''theory," represented by the question, "What is the
law?" and Hart's concerns the "philosopher's" concerns or the
concerns of legal ''philosophy," represented by the question, "What is

law?" Having thus marked out these distinct (though partially
overlapping) terrains, we could then ask whether either Dworkin or
Hart told us something true and valuable, though we would hardly
call

any

differences

between

them

a

"debate,"

or

even

a

"disagreement," any more than we would say that there was a
"disagreement" between the watchmaker and the philosopher over
the nature of time.3
The problem with this way of resolving matters is that, if it were
correct, it would not look very good for Dworkin, who has proceeded
all along on the basis that there is a genuine disagreement between
Hart and himself and, in any event, has tried to demonstrate that
Hart's view of legal rights in controversial cases is wrong, not just
different. Now there are two ways in which Dworkin could resist
this unfortunate (for him) resolution of the controversy. On the one
hand, he could argue that, based on a proper interpretation of The

Concept of Law, Hart really meant to view rights in controversial
cases from the same internal-question-of-law perspective that he
(Dworkin) does. For reasons which will appear below, this argument
is not really available. Failing this, Dworkin could argue that
whatever perspective Hart meant to adopt, the only one that he

could adopt would be an internal one, because there is no external
perspective. At least where legal rights in controversial cases are
concerned, the question for the philosopher can be no different from
the question for the lawyer. Legal philosphy is co-extensive here with

legal theory, and the answer to the question "What is law?" is
exhausted by the answer to the question "What is the law?"
Dworkin has begun to mount this second defense in his most
recent writings. Although he has not yet attempted to generalize it
beyond the question of legal rights in controversial cases, it is in
fact impossible to stop it there. At the

very

least, it entails the

exclusion of any external perspective from the concepts of law, legal
right, and legal duty altogether. But it threatens to lead even further,
to the point where legal philosophy is swallowed up entirely by legal
theory, at which its only concerns are the lawyer's concerns with
internal questions of law. We have, in effect, a bid for conceptual
monopoly by the legal profession. By "taking rights seriously,"
Dworkin really means us to take lawyers seriously. I will argue here
that Dworkin fails in his attempt to exclude all external perspectives
from the concept of law. In doing so, I will defend what I consider
to be Hart's more fully social theory of law. This is important for
scientific, moral, and political reasons shortly to be outlined. But it is
also crucial for legal philosophy itself. Indeed, though this may seem
curious at this point, the main reason why Dworkin fails is
precisely the importance of an external perspective for the enterprise
of philosophizing about law.

II. DWORKIN' S VIEW OF RIGHTS IN CONTROVERSIAL
CASES

Dworkin's first

explicit

consideration of

the

problem of

theoretical perspective can be found in the two contemporaneously
published

essays,

"No Right

Answer"

and "Can Rights be

Controversial?" Now most of the discussion in both of these essays
is taken up with the issue of whether there can be rights in
controversial cases as an internal question of law. Dworkin argues
that it would be both logically
possible and rational for a legal system to so provide in its
"ground rules." Consequently the claim that there cannot be legal
rights in controversial cases, when "construed as a claim within the
enterprise" is false. I do not propose to review these arguments, as I
believe them to be correct and nothing turns on them for present
purposes. Dworkin also argues, though much less elaborately, that
the ground rules of "our own legal system" (by which, apparently, he
means the legal systems of the United States and Great Britain; see
1977b: 32) do provide for rights in controversial cases and that we
should expect all "modern, developed, and complex legal systems"
to do so (1977a: 84). Consequently the claim that there are not legal
rights in controversial cases again when construed as a claim within

the enterprise , is also false. Here Dworkin relies largely on a
theory most fully developed in his own "Hard Cases" (see 1975: 1057;
also 1977d: 81-30). Again, I believe that he is largely correct in this
contention, though the specific theory offered in "Hard Cases" would
seem to need much more research as a description of the way

judges

characteristically

justify decisions

and

much

more

argument as a "normative" theory about the way they should make
them. In any event, nothing turns on this either for present purposes.
Dworkin's third and final contention, the one that puts him in
direct contradiction with Hart and which raises the issue with
which I am· concerned, is made toward the end of each essay. It is
that the claim that rights cannot or do not exist in controversial
cases must be construed

as a claim made from within the

enterprise: "We can only make sense of ( a] philosopher's claim if
we take it to report the special truth conditions of an enterprise"
(1977d: 289). ''The philosopher's claim . . . is a claim that can only
be made from within the enterprise" ( 1977a: 81; 1977b: 28).
In "No Right Answer" this final thesis is put forward in the form

of an allegory about "a group of Dickens scholars" convened ''to
discuss David Copperfield as if David were a real person" (1977a: 73).
In "Can Rights be Controversial?" this literary community becomes a
convention of judges determined to apply the theory of judicial
decision making Dworkin advanced in "Hard Cases," summarized as
follows:
A proposition of law may be asserted as true if it is more consistent with
the theory of law that best justifies settled law than the contrary proposition
of law. It may be denied as false if it is less consistent with that theory of law
than the contrary (1977d: 283).

It will simplify matters if we accept provisionally that this is an

accurate account of "our own legal system" and resolve Dworkin's

literary club and judicial convention into an actual community of
judges carrying on their daily work.
Dworkin supposes that the legal community is visited by a
philosopher who subscribes to the "demonstrability thesis."
This thesis states that if a proposition cannot be demonstrated to be true,
after all the hard facts that might be relevant to its truth are either known
or stipulated, then it cannot be true. By "hard facts" I mean physical facts
and facts about behaviour (including the thoughts and attitudes) of people. By
"demonstrated" I mean backed by arguments such that anyone who
understood the language in which the proposition is formed must assent to its
truth or stand convicted of irrationality (1977a: 76).

This

philosopher, sometimes

referred to

as

an

"empiricist

philosopher" (1977a: 78), because he is supposed to subscribe to "a
strict form of empiricism in metaphysics" (1977a; 77), proceeds to
tell the legal community that "they have ade a very serious
mistake"-that in assuming the existence of rights in controversial
cases, they are accepting a "myth" (1977d: 283). It is a myth even
though it conforms to the ground rules of their enterprise, because
any enterprise with such ground rules must be "based on an illusion"
(1977a: 81). The members of the community, says Dworkin, will
properly reject the philosopher's remonstrances for a number of
reasons.
In the first place, the enterprise "succeeds" in the sense that
the participants are in fact capable of making judgments about the
right answer to controversial cases, the very judgments which the
philosopher claims are "mistaken" (1977a: 78-79). In the second

place, if the philosopher is persuaded to undergo legal training and
then take up a position on the bench, "he will find that he himself
will be able to form judgments of the sort he believes rest on
mistake" (1977d:283). He will in fact have beliefs about the answers
to controversial cases, and he will be able to provide reasons for
them. "So the philosopher' s own capacities will embarrass him"
(1977d: 284; see also 1977a: 79). Third, if he then claims that he has
merely been "seduced" by the training and that an untrained
"independent observer" would find it impossible to make such
judgments, the participants will properly doubt whether he (the
independent observer) has the capacity to judge their debates
because it is "neither surprising nor relevant" that an untrained
person is "incompetent" to make such complicated judgments
(1977d: 284). Finally, if the philosopher claims that the illusion of
the enterprise is the supposition that the judgments made by the
participants are judgments about "the external world,'' they will
answer that they never made any such supposition, that the
enterprise does not seek "to increase our knowledge of the external
world" but rather to fulfill a different sort of purpose (1977a: 81).
It is the enterprise which gives sense to their judgments; and if the

enterprise serves a worthwhile purpose and does so better than a
revised form of the enterprise, that is all it is designed to do. These
are not the only elements of the dialogue between the philosopher
and the judges, but they are the main ones. The important thing to

note about them is the iron conceptual control which Dworkin
accords to the enterprise itself. This is symbolized by the situation of
the entire exchange on the judges' "turf." In order to make his claim
even intelligible here, the philosopher must respect the enterprise's
own purposes, limits, and conventions. Indeed, the only possible
sense which the judges are able to make of the philosopher's claim,
if he is not to be taken as reporting the ground rules of the judicial

enterprise at hand (or of some other actual judicial enterprise), is to
interpret it as calling for the reform of the enterprise, which in this
context must mean a change in the ground rules governing
controversial cases. Thus, instead of making his claim at large, as
philosophers usually do, the philosopher directs his claim to the
judges: " . . . we may take it as a claim external to all such
enterprises, as a claim about facts of the real world which judges . .
. must in the end respect" (1977d: 284; emphasis added). He asks
them to alter their practice , because their practice is said to be
based on an illusion. Yet the philosopher can come up with no
concrete reform, and, so says Dworkin: "If no reform would be
justified, what is the illusion?" (1977a: 80-81).
With this, Dworkin sends the philosopher packing. The claim that
there are no legal rights in controversial cases must be construed as a
claim made from within the enterprise and, for reasons given earlier,
must therefore be false. The external perspective either does not exist
or, in what amounts to the same thing, has no bearing on the concepts

of legal right, legal duty, or, presumably, any other questions of legal
philosophy.

III. HART AND THE "EXTERNAL POINT OF VIEW"

Dworkin has left very little elbow room for the philosopher
wishing to deny that there can be legal rights in controversial cases.
He or she must cast the claim as either a report of the ground rules
of an enterprise or a call for their reform. In the first case the
philosopher' s claim is false. In the second, it calls for a change from a
system in which the judge is to strive for the right answer (conceded
to exist) to one in which the judge is to forsake the quest (though the
right answer is still conceded to exist) at the first sign of controversy
and either deny the claim or exercise his or her "discretion." This
seems silly.
But why should we think that philosophers who deny that there can
be legal rights in controversial cases want to make either of these
types of claims? If we take Hart to be a representative philosopher
who adheres to a version of the "demonstrability thesis" (in the
sense that his concept of law is constructed entirely of what
Dworkin calls "hard facts"), we see immediately that these concerns
are not his. For one thing, if there is any reformism in The Concept
of Law, it is theoretical, not legal, reformism. On the vecy first page
of the book, Hart declares that it is "concerned with the clarification
of the general framework of legal thought, rather than with the

criticism of law or legal policy" (1961: vii); and evecy following page
bears this out. One would search The Concept of Law in vain if one
hoped to find anything resembling the dialogue Dworkin sets up
between the philosopher and the judges.
Second, only by ignoring a central distinction in his book could
one conclude that Hart intended his concept of law to do no more
than report the ground rules of legal systems. I am referring to the
distinction between the "internal" and "external" "aspect," "attitude,"
or ''point of view," which is at least as close to the core of Hart's
theory as the distinction between primacy and secondary rules.
According to Hart, the concept of law, like the concept of a rule,
involves a combination of these two aspects, each as essential as the
other.
The external aspect of a rule, it will be remembered, is the mere
regularity of behavior which is common to both rules and "habits"
(1961: 55-56). And the external attitude is the attitude of those "who
are only concerned with (the rules) when and because they judge
that unpleasant consequences are likely to follow violation " (1977a:
88). Of course, Hart was not the advocate, in The Concept of Law, of
the external point of view. On the contrary, this was the tradition he
received from, among others, Austin and Holmes and which he
sought to revise. If one conceptualized law with Austin in terms of
"commands" and

"habits

of

obedience"

or

with

Holmes

as

''prophecies of what the courts will do in fact," one would not only

miss an important feature of the way law operates in the lives of
many, perhaps most, people, but one would also be at a loss to explain
certain salient features of law, if not how law could exist at all.
Yet Hart did not seek to abolish the external point of view, merely
to supplement it with an internal one. The internal point of view
or attitude is that of those who regard legal rules not merely as a
prediction of what might befall them if they behave in a certain
fashion, but as accepted standards of behavior to which they
conform for other reasons and to which they demand conformity in
others. The internal attitude has to exist because there has to be
somebod y concerned with the

rules

for

nonpredictive reasons;

otherwise the rules would not be applied to nonconformity and could
hardly be said to exist at all. So where one has law, one will have
the internal attitude, at least on the part of officials and perhaps, but
not necessarily, on the part of others. But where one has law, one will
just as necessarily have the external attitude, for without it law would
have neither purpose nor effect:
At any given moment the life of any society which lives by rules, legal or not,
is likely to consist in a tension between those who, on the one hand, accept
and voluntarily co-operate in maintaining the rules, and so see their own and
other persons' behaviour in terms of the rules, and those who, on the other
hand, reject the rules and attend to them only from the external point of view
as a sign of possible punishment. One of the difficulties facing any legal
theory anxious to do justice to the complexity of the facts is to remember the
presence of both these
points of view and not to define one of them out of existence (1977a:

88).

It is necessary to distinguish here between what Hart calls the
"external point of view" and what I have been calling the "external
perspective. " For Hart, the "external point of view" is not intended to
represent a theoretical perspective distinct from the perspective of
the participants in the enterprise, but rather to reflect faithfully the
perspective of one representative group of those participants. In order
to "do justice to the complexity of the facts" the concept of law has
to include the perspective of both representative groups, internal and
external attitude holders. But the point is that in doing so it can
wholly conform to neither. And it is this which logically entails for
Hart a distinct theoretical perspective, the "external perspective" in
the sense in which I have been using it.
Dworkin, of course, faces no such predicament, because he
restricts his view to internal attitude holders only. His frame of
reference is the official realm of lawyers arguing points of law and
judges justifying their decisions. There is no room here for an
external attitude (in Hart's sense). And unless one admits of such
an external attitude, which must then be reconciled somehow with
the internal attitude, there is no need for the philosopher to adopt
an external perspective (in my sense).
Moreover, it is with the inclusion of an external attitude and
the adoption of an external perspective that the concept of law
necessarily becomes more than just a "report" of the official ground

rules of legal systems.

Those with the external attitude

are

concerned with "what the courts do in fact," not merely with what
official theory says that they ought to do.
IV. OTHER CRITICS OF HART'S WORK

Dworkin is not the first of Hart's critics to attempt to define the
external perspective

"out of existence."

In an essay entitled

"Revolutions and Continuity of Law,'' J.M. Finnis (1973: 44-76) did
much the same thing, though in a rather more selfconscious and
deliberate manner. Finnis approached

the question indirectly, as a

critique of the quality of Hart's internal attitude. For Finnis, it was not
enough to exclude from this attitude the attitudes of those who
"regard the law as a reason for acting simply out of one's short-term
self-interest in avoiding sanctions" (1973: 73)-that is to say, who
regard the law purely predictively-while leaving in virtually every
other motive (for example, "mere wish to do as others do,'' "an
unrefiecting inherited or traditional attitude," and "calculations of
long-term self-interest") :
Once one abandons, with Hart, the bad man's concerns as the criterion of
relevance in legal philosophy, there proves to be little reason for stopping
short of accepting the morally concerned man's concerns as that criterion . .
. . There is no distinct "theoretical purpose" of the "scientific observer"
which could be set over against the "practical purposes" that the (mature
man] has in drawing the boundaries of concepts by using them in his life in
society (1973:74-75).

So Finnis concluded that "law can only be fully understood as it is

understood by . . .those who accept it as a specific type of moral
reason for acting" (1973: 74).
Of course, this would be the natural position for Finnis to adopt,
given the concrete question he was seeking to answernamely, what
the ethical duties of citizens were in relation to the laws of the old
and new regimes after a coup d 'etat had taken place. But he
himself seems to have recognized that there could be other sorts of
questions that were the concern of legal philosophy when he wrote:
"Analytical jurisprudence is intrinsically subalternated either to
history or to ethics or to both, and cannot be an independent
discipline, with a viewpoint of its own" (1973:72). Now if there can be
other sorts of questions, it is not unreasonable to suppose that there
might also be other perspectives. And, if we take "history" to stand
for the other social sciences (as I think we can, in the context in
which Finnis mentioned it), including sociology, we might find it
interesting to recall that Hart described The Concept of Law as "an
essay in descriptive sociology" (1961: vii). We might also want to
recall that though, as Finnis pointed out, Hart did abandon the "bad
man" as "the criterion of relevance in legal philsophy,'' he did not
abandon him as a criterion. Was he wrong not to have done so? Finnis
was correct when he suggested that analytical jurisprudence could
not stand on its own, and for this reason he was also correct to
reject as an argument for his specific solution to the problem of
revolution that it might conform to "the ordinary man's point of

view" or a "general consensus of lay and professional opinion"
(1973: 65). There seems no reason for the philosopher to bother with
analysis as an end in itself-that is to say, for the sake of identifying
usage. As C.H. Whiteley has pointed out, this "is the job of
lexicographers" (1969: 6). Indeed, if this were not the case one would
be hardpressed to find a criterion by which to rule out such
familiar and well-established usages

as those of Austin

and

Holmes. So, to quote Whiteley's pithy prose again, one cannot
answer the question of whether an analysis is adequate "until one
knows what purpose the analysis is to be adequate for" (1969: 7).4
A good example of the relevance of pwpose to analysis can be
found in The Concept of Law (1961: 202-207) itself in the context
of the well-known debate between Hart and Lon L. Fuller on the
conceptual connection between law and morals. Fuller had argued,
in effect, that some "laws" were so morally iniquitous that they were
not law at all. In other words, he would have excluded from the
concept of law those norms which had all the attributes of law
except moral acceptability. Hart rejected this position in favor of a
"wider" concept which included morally iniquitous laws, but he did
not do so on the "purely analytical" ground that this wider concept
better comported with "ordinary English usage," which was not
entirely clear in any event. Instead, he argued for the wider
concept on prudential grounds. First, nothing was to be gained and
much lost in ''the theoretical or scientific study of law as a social

phenomenon" if the narrower concept were adopted; it was more
rational to study together the use and abuse of a specific method
of social control than to split it up into two different disciplines.
Second, in order that people would be better equipped to resist
iniquitous rules, "they should preserve the sense that the certification
of something as legally valid is not conclusive of the question of
obedience." Finally, ''to withhold legal recognition from iniquitous
rules may grossly oversimplify the variety of moral issues to which
they give rise" (as in the case under discussion of a person who
relied on a norm which was enforced at the time but was later
retroactively declared invalid on the grounds of moral iniquity). The
merits of the Hart-Fuller debate are not, of course, a issue here. In
fact, both were arguing "externally" in that neither of them regarded
the internal ground rules of any actual legal system as the final test
of the question which they were debating. Nevertheless, as will
shortly be seen, there are strong similarities between the Hart-Fuller
debate and the Dworkin-Hart debate. More important for now is
Hart's purposive approach to analysis and the question of whether it
can be applied to the problem of theoretical perspective and, in
particular, to the question of rights in controversial cases.

V. BACKGROUND OF THE DISPUTE

We might begin by asking how the trouble with rights in
controversial cases arose in the first place. It will be remembered

that Dworkin began the first of his series of pieces on the subject,
"The Model of Rules," (1967; also 1977d) under the heading of
"Embarrassing
considered

Questions."5 It seems that

the most

even then

"embarrassing" feature of the

Dworkin
prevailing

"positivist" (Hartian) theory of law to be its treatment of the
controversial case. As I pointed out earlier, Hart adopted what
might be called a "wait and see" approach to the controversial case
in the sense that unless or until the behavior of the relevant
(judicial) community manifested acceptance of a rule providing for
the right in question, it could not be said to exist. According to
Dworkin, this meant that where no settled rule clearly governed the
case, a judge would have to decide the matter by exercising his or
her "discretion" (1967: 31-39). What "embarrassed" about this state
of affairs was its retroactivity:
[If we accept the positivist thesis], we must acknowledge that the murderer's

family in Riggs 6 and the manufacturer in Henningsen

7

were deprived of their

property by an act of judicial discretion applied ex post facto. This may not
shock many readers-the notion of judicial discretion has percolated through
the legal community-but it does illustrate one of the most nettlesome of the
puzzfes that drive philosophers to worry about legal obligation. If taking
property away in cases like these cannot be justified by appealing to an
established obligation, another justification

must be found, and nothing

satisfactory has yet been supplied (1967:30).

Of course, if one accepts the view that there are

rights in

controversial cases (which Dworkin has since been at pains to
demonstrate), this problem seems to be solved, because there can be

no retroactivity in enforcing a pre-existing (if not altogether preestablished ) right.
Another troublesome aspect of "discretion," raised this time in
"Hard Cases," (1975; see also 1977d: 81-130) was its inconsistency
with democratic notions of the separation of powers. Only elected
officials, at least those without the security of tenure granted to
judges, are supposed to "make" law. Judges are supposed merely to
"apply" it:
[A) community should be governed by men and women who are elected by
and responsible to the majority. Since judges are, for the most part, not
elected, and since they are not, in practice, responsible to the electorate in the
way legislators are, it seems to compromise that proposition when judges make
law (1977d: 84).

The legal theory of controversial cases, therefore, could be consistent
with democratic theory only if judges could be conceived of as
enforcing pre-existing rights, or at least as enforcing rights which did
not depend on the personal preferences of the judge deciding the case
(1977d: 85).
So Dworkin's theory (and the perspective adopted by it)
provides conceptually reassuring answers to these two embarrassing
features of controversial cases, and Hartian positivism is incapable
of doing the same. If neatness were the test of philosophical validity,
there is no question but that Dworkin would win. The problem, of
course, is that beneath the neat concept ual surface Dworkin
provides, the controversial case still leaves plenty to be embarrassed

about.
The main reason why people object to legal retroactivity is that it
renders the full implications of their actions unpredictable. And
whether or not there is a uniquely correct answer to any given point
of law, the implications of an action touching on that point of law
will remain unpredictable to the extent that one cannot be sure what

it is and, more importantly, that the judge who ultimately decides the
case will in fact reach it. By definition, the more controversial the
case, the less sure one can be. Similarly, it is no answer to the
objection from democratic theory that a judge can be conceived of as
merely "applying" the law if he or she reaches the right
conclusion unless the right conclusion is in fact reached. To the
extent that the conclusion which a judge in fact reaches depends on
which judge ultimately decides the case, the objection
democratic theory still

from

holds. Again by definition, the more

controversial the case, the more the outcome will in fact depend on
which judge decides the case.
It seems, then, that the "embarrassing" features of controversial

cases remain even after Dworkin's theory is taken into account. That
they are not eliminated by Hart's theory cannot, therefore, count
against it and in favor of Dworkin's. But it should not surprise
anyone that neither theory could get rid of them, because they
cannot be gotten rid of. The most that could be hoped for is a
theory or argument that would justify them. To do this, it would

have to show that the system of deciding legal cases is in fact as
predictable and impersonal as
sacrificing

it

other, more important

possibly could

be

without

values. This would include

showing, among other things, that judges are as well equipped and
inclined to determine the right answer to questions of law as is
humanly possible and that the structure of the legal system enables
and encourages them to do so better than any alternative structure
could. Neither Hart nor Dworkin has attempted to carry out such a
programme.
There is, however, one very important difference between the
two theories which bears on these questions. It is that the elements
of

Dworkin's

theory (lawyers'

legal

arguments

and

official

justifications of judicial decisions) systematically exclude these
embarrassing features, whereas the elements of Hart's theory
(official and unofficial behavior and the internal and external
attitudes manifested by that behavior) systematically include them.
The choice, then, is between

a theory which builds in the

problematic aspects of the controversial case and one which builds
them out.
It is important to notice that though Dworkin's theory excludes the

problems of predictability and judicial lawmaking as elements of the
concept of legal rights in controversial cases, it does not, on its face,
make them irrelevant or otherwise exclude the possibility of their
being raised at all. We are not prevented, for example, from noting

the divergence between official

theory and practice, or from

pointing out how unpredictable legal decisions may in fact be in a
given legal system, or even from generalizing this into a critique of a
whole system of adjudication if we are so minded and can back up our
claims

empirically.

All

we

are

prevented

from

doing

is

characterizing them in a particular way. Specifically, we are not to
deny the status of a legal right to a claim on the sole ground that
it cannot be predicted with confidence that it will be recognized by
a court. Instead, we are to say such things as "X has a legal right, but
it is not possible to predict whether he or she will be able to enforce
it," and "Judge Y has a legal duty to decide this issue in that way, but
there is no telling whether he or she is willing or able to do so"
(presumably, we are to say such things even when we have good
grounds for believing that a claim will be denied).
This manner of speaking is familiar enough, at least to lawyers. It
is not without its dangers, however, and they are of a kind very
similar to those which Hart pointed out in Fuller's "narrow" conception
of law discussed earlier. I have in mind the possibility that people will
mistake their legal rights for their enforceable claims or the way judges
justify their decisions for the way that they actually reach them. This
would have the effect of inspiring a confidence in and lending a
legitimacy to the legal system when it perhaps deserved neither. It may
be that Dworkin's way of conceptualizing things does not enhance the
likelihood of this happening,8 but it is worth noting that he himself

seems to make precisely this sort of error in "Hard Cases."
It will be remembered that the "Rights Thesis" presented in that

article claims not only to prescribe how judges ought to decide
controversial cases but also to describe how they actually do decide
such cases. According to Dworkin, his theory is concerned with
"judicial practice"

and

"explains

the present structure of the

institution of adjudication" (1977d: 123).

It argues that "judicial

decisions . . . in hard cases, characteristically are . . . generated by
principle. . . ." (1977d: 84). Andit is said to provide a more adequate
"phenomenological account of the judicial decision" (1977d: 86) than
other suggested theories. But of course, it does no such thing,
because the only evidence offered for the thesis (and there is very
little of it at that ) is officially reported justifications of judicial
decisions. Thus unless we assume, as if the Realists never existed,
that judicial justifications accurately describe how judges actually
reach their decisions, this · Rights Thesis is only a theory of how
judges characteristically justify decisions, not how they reach them.
Whether Dworkin makes such an assumption or merely considers
the question irrelevant is impossible to tell.
Another disturbing aspect of "Hard Cases" is the way in which
the issue of the predictability of judicial decisions gets submerged in
the principle of "articulate consistency" (1977d: 87-88).9 Now it is
clear that there is a moral value in treating like cases alike, but there
is also a moral value in making judicial decisions predictable.

Occasionally, for example in controversial cases, these principles
will conflict. This should call for some hard moral balancing, but for
Dworkin it does not seem to do so, because predictability does not
seem, for him, to have a separate moral value. In controversial cases,
one of the opposing claimants will have to be taken by surprise, but
all this means for Dworkin is that one of the claimants will have
been unjustified in his or her expectations 10-unjustified in the sense
that the expectations were not in accordance with the principle of
articulate consistency. Apparently, one should not expect what one
does not deserve. Maybe so, but people (if only the "bad men"
among us) do have a tendency to rely on "hard facts," and the
question of whether the legal system should strive for greater
predictability as an end in itself deserves at least some attention. It is
not unreasonable to postulate that Dworkin's refusal to give it any
stems from his preoccupation with the internal point of view to the
exclusion of everything else.
These political

and moral dangers inherent in Dworkin's

theory of controversial cases lead to a final point. It is that a
concept of legal rights in controversial cases which pushes from
center stage the question of enforceability is not only dangerous, but
also rather uninteresting from a scientific point of view. Legal rights
only become interesting when they have some impact on human
existence. Why anyone (aside from judges professionally concerned
with putting their decisions on an acceptable footing) would want to

study "legal rights" divorced from the question of whether they
make any difference to the outcome of cases is more than a little
puzzling. Even advocates, though they naturally will be concerned
with the proper way to frame their arguments in court, will want
also to know the likely impact of their arguments on the actual
outcome of cases if they are to be of any use as advisers to
prospective litigants.
But judges, lawyers, and even litigants are not the only ones
with interests in controversial cases. For the legal, political, or
social theorist-indeed

for anyone

concerned

with the human

condition-the importance of the controversial case is that it signals a
sort of crisis in the legal system. The crisis may consist of a
contradiction between accepted past practice and

what seems

appropriate in the instant case or between opposing factions of the
official community or both. In any event, it differs in character from
the ordinary conflict of claims between representative claimants
under settled rules with which a legal system deals every day,
because it occurs at the official level. It is the way in which this
crisis is resolved and the role official justification plays in its
resolution that are the scientifically interesting things about it, not
the internal consistency of the justification standing on its own. A
concept of legal rights in controversial cases that is restricted to
the internal consistency of official justification is of no use in
investigating these questions. Worse than that, it actually obliterates

the uniqueness of the controversial case by denying that the
existence of a crisis can ever be anything more than apparent.
Every case has a correct answer; it is just that in some cases the
right answer is not widely recognized.
If all this seems rather abstract, perhaps an example will help to

clarify matters. In one of the most controversial cases of recent
American constitutional jurisprudence, Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, 1978, the Supreme Court of the United States
struck down the admissions program of a California medical school
which had reserved a quota of its places for historically deprived
racial minorities. In a split decision, the Court ordered that Bakke, a
white who had been refused admission under the program, be admitted.
Before the case was decided, Dworkin had argued quite convincingly
that Bakke had "no case" either morally or (therefore) legally (1977e: 11).
After it was decided, Dworkin argued with impeccable lawyer's skill
that, technically speaking, the Bakke decision did not even settle the
question of whether the precise program involved in the case is
forbidden under American law (1978a: 20).
How would Dworkin have us describe the post-Bakke situation?
Shall we say, as his theory seems to dictate, that in the United States
all schools (including the school involved in Bakke itself) have the
legal right to do what was forbidden in Bakke? Shall we leave this
statement unqualified by the impossibility of predicting how the
next case will in fact turn out? Would such an unqualified statement

be of any value, except to mislead, outside of a courtroom? If not,
shall we not follow Hart and say that in theory there is such a right
but we shall have to wait and see whether it becomes a reality?
It should be clear by now that what is necessary is a concept of

legal rights in controversial cases that makes such issues as
enforceability and the interplay between legal theory and legal
practice as important as official justification, a concept that includes
both the internal and the external points of view. In other words, it
makes all the moral, political and scientific sense in the world for
legal philosophy to deny the status of legal rights to those claims
for which it cannot be predicted with confidence that they will
actually be enforced even if, according to the ground rules of the
legal system concerned, or any other normative system, they ought
to be enforced.

VI. THEORETICAL

PERSPECTIVE

BEYOND

THE

CONTROVERSIAL CASE

At the beginning of this essay, I suggested that though Dworkin
has developed his attack on the external perspective for the narrow
purpose of defending his theory of legal rights in controversial cases,
it is in fact impossible to restrict it thus. This is partly for the
obvious reason that a theory of legal rights in controversial cases
logically entails a whole theory of legal rights and also a whole
theory of law. But it is also because the same methodological issue

of theoretical perspective which arises on the "micro" level of
controversial cases also arises in connection with the larger questions
which have traditionally been of concern to legal philosophers. In
fact, it is at the "macro" level that the inadequacies of a theory of law
based on a purely internal perspective manifest themselves most
clearly for the same political, moral, and scientific reasons which
counsel against the exclusion of the external perspective from the
issue of legal rights in controversial cases. Again, it is not merely that
there are important questions which need to be asked about law,
apart from internal questions about the law of any given legal
system; it is that these questions can best be asked through the
vehicle of a concept of law which includes both internal and
external perspectives.
I want briefly to allude to three types of issues which illustrate
this point. None of them, it will be noticed, can do without answers
to the internal questions of what the law is; but, equally, none of
them can do without an external perspective.
The first is a variation on the theme of the divergence between
theory and practice mentioned earlier. It is a widely acknowledged
contribution of the so-called American Legal Realist school of
jurisprudence to have drawn attention to the fact that officially stated
rules and justifications of judicial decisions do not always correspond
precisely to the actions taken in their name. Indeed, some of the types of
reasons given by common law judges for their decisions have been

found to be incapable of motivating those decisions (cf. Stone, 1964:
240-280). Naturally, if one were to restrict the study of law to these
rules and justifications, one would not be aware of this rather important
fact. This is not, of course, an objection to Dworkin's position. For, as
was mentioned earlier in connection with controversial cases, there is
nothing in it to prevent one from noting the degree to which theory is
not actually applied in practice or from making this the subject of
scientific study and theoretical debate. Of course, in Dworkin's view
we would have to call the theory "law" and the practice something
else, but this too would be all right, as long as the point was merely
that in some legal systems on some occasions practice did not accord
with theory.
Where Dworkin's point of view proves inadequate is in the realm of
the more fundamental claim that the divergence between theory and
practice is an inevitable feature of law in general and not just a
problem of some legal systems. This, it seems to me, is the most
important aspect of such statements as "the constitution is what the
judges say it is." Such statements emphatically draw attention to the
personal responsibility of the officials of any legal system for their
actions and oppose the ideology of complete impersonality which
many legal systems seem to have found useful. A theory of law which
adopts a purely internal point of view is dangerous, because it sidesteps
such claims a priori as theoretical misconceptions instead of meeting
them head on and, to the extent necessary, accommodating them.

Furthermore, insofar as such claims are true, "law" is artifically
divorced from the real impact of legal systems on the lives of the
people subject to them and ceases to be an object of interest
outside of legal trade schools.
Leaving room within the concept of law for an analysis of the
divergence between theory and practice is also necessary in order to
appreciate the full range of interplay between the two, especially
the role which theory seems to play fo the legitimation of practice.
From Dworkin's purely internal point of view, one must take theory
("law") on its own terms. It can be right or wrong (that is to say
consistent

or inconsistent

with conventional

and

institutional

morality) in the abstract, but it
can have no other function than to motivate practice . This, after
all, is how judges present the doctrine they write: as ''reasons" for
making the decisions they make. On the other hand, to conceive of
official doctrine and legal theory as rationalizing practice or
rendering

it

acceptable

requires

an

external

perspective.

Consequently, a claim that an important function of theory in any
legal system is ideological and that this is an essential feature of
law in general, an aspect of its "nature," cannot be made within
Dworkin's conceptual framework, no matter how strong the basis for
the claim.11
The divergence between theory and practice on the one hand
and their interplay on the other might be characterized as "formal"

issues in that they are not directly concerned with the "content" or
substance of law. Yet there are substantive issues, too, for which a
concept of law restricted to an internal perspective is inadequate.
The one I want to mention here, generally associated with Marxism,
though not restricted to it, concerns what might be called the
"historical nature of law."
Many claims can be made (and, if true, accommodated) within a
theory such as Dworki.n's about the historical role of laws or even of
certain legal systems from time to time and place to place. They may
be

said

to

have

promoted

justice or injustice,

happiness or

unhappiness, or even to have benefited one class at the expense of
others. The problem arises, as usual, with claims of a more fundamental
sort- for example, the cluster of Marxist claims (roughly) that the
content and form of law vary according to certain definite historical
developments in the mode of material production; that, indeed, the
very existence of law depends on the division of society into
classes; and that, consequently, the achievement of a classless society
upon the demise of the capitalist mode of production will lead to
the disappearance of law altogether.
No doubt these are very controversial claims, and it is not my
intention to defend them here. I merely want to point out that they
are absolutely incompatible with a concept of law restricted to the
i!lternal perspective, that is to say restricted to the self-concept of
legal systems. 12 No theory which seeks to transcend or oppose this

self-concept, to regard it critically as merely an aspect of law and
not the whole story, can even be articulated within a concept of law
that excludes the external perspective .
It bears emphasizing that the necessity of including an external

perspective in the concept of law does not depend on claims of the
general sort just discussed being true, merely on their being
arguable. And if it is arguable that laws and legal systems are not all
or only that which they themselves claim to be, then, to paraphrase
Hart, there is nothing to be gained and much lost in conceding by
definition that they are.

VII. DWORKIN AND HIS CRITICS

Since

writing

"No

Right

Answer"

and

"Can

Rights

be

Controversial?" Dworkin has had some further thoughts on the
methodological

issues

which I

have been discussing.

Though

admittedly incomplete, they bear brief mention if only to confirm the
importance

of

the

problem

of

theoretical perspective to an

understanding of his work.
In a reply to an article by Stephen R. Munzer, (1977c: 10601068),
Dworkin brings to life the imagined dialogue between the "empiricist
philosopher" and the judges, discussed earlier (1977c: 1246-1250; see
also 1978b: 331-338). Munzer had argued that even if there were a
unique right answer to controversial questions of law, it would still

be incorrect to claim that when judges decide hard cases the rights
announced in their opinions exist before their decisions are handed
down. This was because the only practical interest attaching to the
classification of a right as either pre-existing or newly created
concerned whether or not there was advance notice of the right, "an
important aspect of fairness." Since "controversial rights" could not
give notice by definition, then they should not be classified as preexisting.
Munzer did not relate his point to a general theory of theoretical
perspective; so Dworkin, like the judges, saw only two alternatives.
Either Munzer was saying, as an internal statement of law (or
morals), that only those rights exist which are uncontroversial or
clearly identifiable in advance, or he was calling for the "reform of
our legal system" and "proposing a new theory of legal rights,
according to which a party simply does not have a legal right unless
he is able to demonstrate to the satisfaction of all reasonable lawyers
that he does" (1977c: 1249). But it seems obvious that Munzer did
not want to make either of these points but rather to argue, as I
argued earlier, that the classification of a legal right or duty as "preexisting"

from

the

standpoint

of

legal

philosophy

requires

consideration of factors outside of the official theory of the system
in question. One such factor is the degree to which the right or duty
could have been ascertained in advance, because one of the main
reasons people concern themselves about the preexistence of rights

and duties is to evaluate the fairness of official action. It counts
against the fairness of an action if those affected by it were not
given sufficient advance notice to organize their affairs in light of it.
More significant than Dworkin's reply to Munzer are more recent
remarks provoked by an article by E. Philip Soper (1977: 473). 13 In
them, Dworkin reflects for a few brief pages on just what it is that he
is trying to do with the non-normative side of his Rights Thesis. He
denies that it is merely "empirical generalization, linguistic study
[or]

linguistic

exhortation."

Nevertheless

he

says that

it is

"conceptual" like other "theories of law" in the sense that it is a
defence of "a particular conception of a concept." While he says that
he does not "pretend to have yet given an adequate or even clear
account of that activity,'' he elaborates it in the following way:
We all-at least all lawyers-share a concept of law and of legal right, and we
contest . different conceptions of that concept. Positivism defends a particular
conception, and I have tried to defend a competing conception . . . I concentrate
on the details of a particular legal system with which I am especially familiar,
not simply to show that positivism provides a poor account of that system,
but to show that positivism provides a poor conception of the concept of a
legal right . . . . Positivists and I do not dispute about details of practice that
could be settled by looking more carefully to see what is said in books, or
by framing more intelligent questionnaires for judges. We may disagree
about matters of that sort, but this disagreement is not fundamental. We
fundamentally disagree about what our practice comes to, that is, about which
philosophical account of the practice is superior (1978b:
351-352).

One hesitates to read very much into a passage so tentatively

expressed. However, it does seem to mark a departure from the
methodological dogmatism of "No Right Answer,'' "Can Rights be
Controversial?" and Dworkin's reply to Munzer. It is at least clear that
Dworkin now recognizes that some of the issues between himself and
his philosophical opponents are methodological ones.
Of course, Dworkin has not yet suggested how these issues might
be resolved. He does seem to rule out, under the heading of
"linguistic exhortation,'' the suggestion that "positivism . . . proposes
that legal concepts should be used in a certain way, for clarity,
convenience or for some political motive" (1978b: 351). But this
may merely mean that Dworkin does not take the claim of positivism
to be a call for the reform of lawyers' language for any of the
reasons mentioned; certainly, this interpretation would be consistent
with the emphasis on "linguistic" and the deprecating phrase
"simply hortatory." However, it may mean that in the choice of a
conception of law (including its theoretical perspective) clarity,
convenience, and politics are all irrelevant. If this is Dworkin's point,
one wonders what criteria that leaves with which to defend his own
choice.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

The problem of theoretical perspective is not peculiar to the
philosophy of law. It can be found at the threshhold of all social
theory, arising as it does from the inevitable variation in meaning

which social events have among the different participants in them.
No doubt the range of possible perspectives is infinitely more varied
than the simple dichotomy made use of here between "internal"
and "external."14 But this only serves to emphasize the main point,
which is that the proper perspective for the theorist to adopt is not
predetermined. It remains a matter of choice, or, as F.E. Sparshott
has written:
This compound problem, of the nature of man and of his world, is not a factual
one but deliberative: one to be settled, that is, not by finding things out but
by making up one's mind. There are, of course, hard facts that determine
what answers to the question are admissible, but it is not these facts that are
in question. There are many ways in which, many aspects under which, we
men can think about ourselves, and about the world considered as our
environment, without committing detectable errors of fact. So the question
"What is man?" becomes "What shall we make of man?" (1972: 110-111).

Of course, we are not entirely free, even within the limits of the
hard facts, to make what we will of "man" or of the world. On the
contrary, we are everywhere hemmed in by moral, political, and
scientific considerations of the sort I have relied upon here to make
out the case for an external perspective in the concept of law.
Indeed, this is what was meant by the statement made earlier that
Dworkin fails in his attempt to exclude the external perspective

because of its importance for the philosophy of law. What we make
of the concept of law is a matter of choice, but we cannot afford to
choose as Dworkin does.

All of this is not to say that a perspective such as that
adopted by Dworkin may not suffice for some legitimate concerns
about laws and legal systems. But it is clear that for many it will
not. Dworkin's mistake is to assume that his concerns are the only
ones worth having.

NOTES
1 See, for example, A.A. Ehrenzweig, Psychoanalytic Jurisprudence (1971: 51-72)
for such a theory of the Hart/Fuller debate. A good discussion of the "place of goals
and motives in philosophy" may be found in J.O. Wisdom, Philosophy and its Place in
our Culture (1975: Ch. 22).
2 The notion of an internal and external perspective will be familiar to students

of ethics. A recent example of its use is the discussion of the institution of promising in
Mackie (1977: 66-73).
3 When I was a child waiting outside a movie theatre one Saturday afternoon I
asked a ragged passerby something like "Hey Mister, what's the time?" to which he
replied in measured tones, finger upraised, "Time is the space betweeri two thoughts!'
There is much in the Dworkin/Hart dispute which resembles this exchange.
4 See also MacPherson (1978: 201): "Political concepts are generally shaped by
theorists who are not simply grammarians or logicians but who are seeking to justify
something."
5 An earlier essay, "Judicial Discretion" (1963), contains many of the ideas of
Dworkin's later work in embryo. However, they are kept within somewhat more modest
confines. There is no attack on Hart or on ''positivism" or any pretension to a "theory of
law" as opposed to a theory of the judicial decision. This piece was not included in the
collection Taking Rights Seriously, (1977d) which begins with "The Model of Rules I."
6 Riggs v. Palmer (115 N.Y. 506 (1889]); murderer of testator held incapable of
inheriting under will.
7 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. (32 N.J. 358 [1960] ); manufacturer
held liable for personal injuries due to defective goods in spite of contract limiting
liability.
B Though if Dworkin's empirical observation at the beginning of "Judicial
Discretion" (1963: 624) is correct, one wonders where ''the layman" got his ideas:
To the layman a lawsuit or a trial is an event in which a judge
determines a controversy by application of established principles, rather than
new principles invented to dispose of the case. He knows that individual
judges may fail this ideal of justice; but he believes such failures to be
aberrations, their occurrence marking injustice rather than its opposite. To him
judges should and in general do, in the words of the admittedly metaphorical
maxim, find the la,w and not make it. The layman's respect for law is
founded in large part on his view that this is a fair method of deciding
controversies.
9 Articulate consistency is a demand of "the doctrine of political responsibility
." It requires that judges and other political officials make only those decisions
which they can justify within a political theory which also justifies the other
decisions they have made or propose to make. Dworkin uses it to explain ''the special
concern that judges show for both precedents and hypothetical examples." This is
why, according to Dworkin, judges treat the actual holding of a case with more
respect than the reasons given for it.
io "If . . .the plaintiff's claim is doubtful, then the court must, to some extent,
surprise one or another of the parties; and if the court decides that on balance the
plaintiff's argument is stronger, then it will also decide that the plaintiff was, on
balance, more justified in his expectations" (1977d: 86).
11 In Raz's taxonomy of the functions of law, this figures as an "indirect social
function." Of the general category, Raz writes:"the indirect effects of the law as
conceived here are.far from being relatively unimportant by-products of the law. They
are part of its essential function in any society" (Raz, 1973:299).
12 Cf. Marx, 1859, reprinted in Bottomore and Rubel (1964: 51-52): At a
certain stage of their development, the material forces of production in
society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or-what
is but a legal expression for the same thing-with the property
relations within which they had been at work before. From forms of
development of the forces of production these relations turn into their
fetters. Then occurs a period of social revolution. With the change of
the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or
less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations the
distinction should always be made between the material
transformation of the economic conditions of production which can be
determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political ,
religious, aesthetic or philosophical-in short ideological-forms in
which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just
as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks o/
himself, so can we not judge of such a period of transformation by its
own consciousness; on the contrary, this consciousness must rather be

explained from the contradictions of material life, from the existing
conftict between the social forces of production and the relations of
production. (emphasis added)
13 Dworkin's methodological comments do not seem connected to any of the
arguments made by Soper, so they (the arguments) will not be repeated here.
Dworkin's reply is in "A Reply to Critics" (1978b); and the passage with which I am
concerned commences at p. 350.
14 Unger draws the distinction between "the standpoint of the agent [and) the
perspective of the observer-subjective and objective meaning" and analyzes the
problem of theoretical perspective in this way:
If we disregard the meanings an act has for its author and for the other
members of the society to which he belongs, we run the risk of losing sight of
what is peculiarly social in the conduct we are trying to understand. If,
however, we insist on sticking close to the reflective understanding of the
agent or his fellows, we are deprived of a standard by which to distinguish
insight from illusion or to rise above the self-images of different ages and
societies, through comparison. Thus, subjective and objective meaning must
somehow both be taken into account (1976: 15, 19).
* These articles are included in Taking Rights Seriously, 1977.
** This article is included in the 1977 paperback edition only, under the title "A
Reply to Critics."
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